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John D. Hathcoat 
James Madison University 
 
The semantics, or meaning, of validity is a fluid concept in educational and psychological testing.  
Contemporary controversies surrounding this concept appear to stem from the proper location of validity.  
Under one view, validity is a property of score-based inferences and entailed uses of test scores.  This view is 
challenged by the instrument-based approach, which contends that tests themselves are either valid or invalid.  
These perspectives are contrasted by their ontological and epistemological emphases, as well as their breadth 
of validation focus.  Ontologically, these positions diverge in their alliance with psychometric realism, or the 
position that attributes characterizing the aim of psychological and educational measurement exist in the 
actual world and that claims about their existence can be justified.  Epistemologically, these positions deviate 
in the function of truth when accepting validity claims and inform distinct lines of inquiry in the validation 
process.  Finally, validity under the instrument-based approach is restricted to a single proposition –namely, 
that observed score variation is caused by an underlying attribute.  Though seemingly arbitrary, these distinct 
validity semantics may have a range of implications on assessment practices. 
A test is valid if it measures what it intends to measure.  
Various textbooks repeat this statement despite a 
number of theorists who argue that this position 
oversimplifies the concept of validity as well as the 
validation process (see Lissitz, 2009).  However, the 
semantics, or meaning, of validity is controversial in 
academic discourse.  This controversy has a long 
history, though the contemporary debate appears to 
stem from disagreements about the proper location of 
validity.  One view locates validity as a property of 
score-based interpretations and entailed uses of test 
scores (Messick, 1989; Kane, 1992).  This position has 
come to dominate validity theory, as evidenced by the 
most recent standards for educational and 
psychological testing resembling this perspective 
(AERA, APA, NCME, 1999).  However, the 
“instrument-based” approach challenges this view by 
locating validity as a property of tests themselves 
(Borsboom, 2005; Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & van 
Heerden, 2004).  Formal testing is but one aspect of 
educational and psychological assessment.  
Nevertheless, these two perspectives have important 
ramifications for assessment practitioners.  
The concept of validity is central to assessment 
processes, data-driven decisions, and reporting 
procedures (Moss, Girard, & Haniford, 2006).  Validity 
semantics dictate which inferences one may legitimately 
label “valid” or “invalid”.  Moreover, semantic 
differences have consequences on the aims of score 
validation – namely, what evidence should one seek in 
the validation process.  The present paper delineates 
validity semantics by contrasting their ontological and 
epistemological emphases, as well as their breadth of 
validation focus.  Ontology is a branch of metaphysics 
aiming to ascertain the underlying structure of reality 
(Poli, 2010).  Epistemology on the other hand, studies 
the nature, limitations, and justification of knowledge 
(Williams, 2001).  Ontological questions pertain to 
“what exists,” whereas epistemological questions tend 
to focus on the possibility and process of obtaining 
knowledge.  For example, do observed scores reflect 
differences in a “real” attribute?  Is such knowledge 
possible, and if so, how are such claims justified or 
warranted?  These philosophical questions are 
fundamental to validity theory, which encompasses 
both ontological (e.g. reality of attributes) and 
epistemological (e.g. evidential standards) aspects of 
score-based interpretations.   
Central to this paper is the concept of 
psychometric realism.  Psychometric realism refers to 
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the view that attributes characterizing the aim of 
psychological and educational measurement exist in the 
actual world and that claims about their existence can 
be justified (see Hood, 2009).  Psychometric realism 
has both an ontological and epistemic component.  
Ontologically, a psychometric realist views attributes 
such as “personality,” “critical thinking,” and 
“intelligence” as entities that exist within the world.  
Importantly, a psychometric realist also believes that it 
is possible to justify claims about the existence of these 
entities.  An antirealist would deny at least one of these 
positions.  For example, an antirealist may deny the 
ontological status of attributes or the possibility of 
warranting claims about their existence.     
There are many points of contention with respect 
to validity semantics in educational and psychological 
assessment (Moss et al., 2006; Newton, 2012).  
However, this discussion is delimited by the work of 
two prominent validity theorists.  First, the argument-
based approach to validity is described (Kane, 1992, 
2006) given that this view coincides with many of the 
historical transformations characterizing validity 
semantics.  Following this account is the critique 
offered by Borsboom et al., (2004), which falls under 
the instrument-based approach.  With respect to the 
ontological, these views diverge in whether they require 
adherence to psychometric realism.  Likewise, these 
perspectives deviate in their epistemological 
characteristics, such as the role accorded to truth in 
validity theory.  Finally, the instrument-based approach 
has a relatively narrow validation focus when compared 
to the argument-based approach.  Before proceeding to 
this examination, the following section provides a brief 
overview of the historical evolution of validity 
semantics in educational and psychological testing.   
A Brief History of Validity Semantics 
The application of statistical concepts, such as the 
theory of errors, to the measurement of mental 
phenomena can be traced to the later part of the 19th 
Century (see Traub, 2005).  However, it was not until 
the early 1900’s that validity, as a formal concept, 
became a point of vivid discussion.  Efforts to 
articulate a theory of validity occurred within 
educational and psychological testing.  Other academic 
disciplines share concerns with measurement error 
(Taylor, 1997); however, the “physical” sciences lack an 
analogous discourse aiming to formulate a formal 
theory of validity.  Validity semantics, it would seem, is 
primarily a concern among academicians who have 
sought to apply measurement models to intraindividual 
and interindividual variation in social research.  
Numerous authors have provided an overview of the 
historical evolution of validity theory within these 
disciplines (see Kane, 2001, 2009; Lissitz & Samuelsen, 
2007; Moss, Girard, & Haniford, 2006; Sireci, 1998, 
2009).  This section broadly outlines this development, 
while emphasizing some of the philosophical 
implications of distinct validity semantics.  
Prior to the 1940’s, predicting subsequent 
performance was a primary concern among test 
developers.  During this time, various advancements in 
statistical techniques were gaining widespread 
acceptance in the social and behavioral sciences.  For 
example, this period saw advancements in correlation 
coefficients (Pearson, 1920; Rodgers & Nicewander, 
1988), and factor analysis was developed to address 
theoretical issues relevant to intelligence testing 
(Spearman, 1904).  Each of these advancements 
however, had slightly different implications on validity 
semantics, which in turn, contributed to distinct 
positions toward psychometric realism.  Covariation 
between two variables is fundamental to both 
prediction and causation, though concerns with the 
former reinforced a view of validity wherein predicting 
criterion variables were paramount.  Tests were 
generally valid for any criterion that it predicted 
(Cureton, 1951; Guilford, 1946).  At least two 
challenges existed with this view.   
The first difficulty is the problem of the criterion 
(Chisolm, 1973; Amico, 1995), which pertains to the 
challenge of answering questions about what we know 
and how we know.  To recognize instances of 
knowledge it seems that we must have a criterion or 
procedure.  To illustrate this point, Chisholm (1973) 
refers to our ability to determine the quality of apples.  
If we wish to identify apple quality then we need a 
criterion to distinguish “good” apples from “bad” 
apples.  We may choose to sort apples into different 
piles based upon their color, though any criterion is 
adequate for this example.  The problem arises 
whenever we ask whether our criterion worked in that 
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color actually separated good apples from bad apples.  
How can we investigate our criterion without already 
knowing something about which apples are good and 
bad?  In order to evaluate the criterion of color it seems 
that we need prior knowledge about apple quality, 
which would itself depend on a different criterion.  
Simply put, we appear caught within a vicious circle 
wherein recognizing instances of knowledge requires a 
criterion that cannot be evaluated without existent 
knowledge.   
When applied to educational and psychological 
testing, this minimally implies that one must assume the 
validity of a criterion variable when making inferences 
about the validity of a newly developed instrument.  
Questions about the validity of a criterion variable 
require further assumptions about a new criterion, and 
this could easily lead to an infinite regress (Kane, 2001).  
This position towards validity therefore appears more 
reasonable when the criterion variable is intrinsically 
valid (Gulliksen, 1950), which may occur when using 
scores to predict performance on tasks that are either 
the same, or very similar to, specific demands within 
occupational and educational settings.  This leads to the 
second challenge for predictive or criterion-related 
validity, which consists of identifying adequate criterion 
variables.  In some situations, identifying an acceptable 
criterion is problematic.  This is particularly the case for 
many concepts investigated within educational and 
psychological testing.   
Around this same period, various authors 
discussed the importance of test content within validity 
theory.  For example, there are connections between 
content validity and criterion related validity (Lissitz & 
Samuelsen, 2007).  Tests are constructed for a specific 
purpose (Rulon, 1946), and focusing on test content 
reinforced the view that items/tasks constitute samples 
from a theoretical universe of possible tasks (see Sireci, 
1998).  An emphasis on test content, coupled with the 
prior development of factor analysis (Spearman, 1904), 
promoted a conceptual and statistical framework for 
advancing psychometric realism (Mulaik, 1987).  In 
other words, the question of validity, though 
multifaceted, aimed at investigating “whether a test 
really measures what it purports to measure” (Kelley, 
1927, p. 14).  Factor analysis accords with the notion 
that real attributes underlie variation in observed 
scores.  Though such techniques seem aligned with 
psychometric realism, many critics have argued that 
factor analysis is an instrumental tool that simplifies 
empirical observations (e.g. Anastasi, 1938).  Under this 
latter view, extracted factors reflect useful ways to 
summarize observations without necessitating reference 
to actual entities.  If extracted factors reference entities 
in the actual world, then such procedures have the 
potential to provide insight into the world, as it exists.   
These early controversies set the stage for broad 
distinctions about the proper location of validity.  
However, a seminal article by Cronbach and Meehl 
(1955) eventually led to radical changes in validity 
semantics, which support a departure from 
psychometric realism.  Cronbach and Meehl were 
concerned about situations wherein a target domain 
and/or a relevant criterion remained ambiguous.  For 
example, if an instructor were creating a geometry test 
the course objectives may constitute a target domain 
from which item sampling occurs.  However, other 
concepts of interest, such as anxiety, may cease to have 
a clear domain from which to sample items or an 
unambiguous criterion for investigating subsequent 
predictions.  In these latter cases, Cronbach and Meehl 
argued that what is necessary is the establishment of 
construct validity.  However, their conceptualization of 
construct validity relies upon the construction of a 
nomological network, and this network aligns with logical 
positivist aims to create a theory of scientific 
knowledge without metaphysical assumptions.  Stated 
differently, construct validity as articulated by 
Cronbach and Meehl allows one to infer the meaning 
of unobservable constructs without requiring them to 
exist as an entity within the world.   
To understand this effort, it is first necessary to 
make a distinction between theoretical and 
observational language (Carnap, 1950).  Theoretical 
language may refer to such concepts as “temperature,” 
“gravity,” and “quarks,” or to such terms as 
“personality,” “intelligence,” and “anxiety”.  The logical 
positivist movement reflects an effort to connect 
theoretical language to observational language via 
logical reconstruction.  For example, anxiety is not 
directly observable, but instead anxiety is a theoretical 
concept used to account for empirical observations.  
3
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From a logical positivist perspective, anxiety may be 
viewed as a theoretical term standing in relation to 
observational language (e.g., John has a heart rate of 
120 beats per minute) through correspondence rules 
(e.g. increases in heart rate reflect proportionate 
increases in anxiety).  Construct validity consists of 
placing anxiety within a nomological network.  This 
requires identifying law-like relationships between 
anxiety and other theoretical terms within an 
interlocking web or system.  Theory may suggest law-
like relationships between anxiety, depression, and self-
esteem.  A positive correlation between anxiety and 
depression, as well as a negative correlation between 
anxiety and self-esteem may provide therefore provide 
marginal support for such a system.   
Cronbach and Meehl’s (1955) view of construct 
validity reflects a strong departure from psychometric 
realism, given that one may infer the meaning of 
theoretical terms without requiring them to exist as 
entities within the world.  Thus, “scientifically speaking, 
to ‘make clear what something is’ means to set forth the 
laws in which it occurs” (p. 290).  Theoretical terms, 
such as anxiety, derive meaning from their placement 
within a nomological network.  Altering one aspect of 
this network (e.g. anxiety is positively correlated with 
self-esteem) changes the meaning of theoretical terms 
within a system.  With this movement away from 
realism, it is but a small step toward strictly locating 
validity as a property of score-based inferences and 
entailed uses of test scores.  There is some ambiguity 
however, with respect to the proper location of validity 
as discussed in this article.  Cronbach and Meehl readily 
identify construct validity as an interpretation to be 
defended.  However, they were “not in the least 
advocating construct validity as preferable to other 
three kinds (concurrent, predictive, content)” (p. 300).  
Instead, construct validity is an additional consideration 
in testing.  Though they indicate that “one does not 
validate a test, but only principle for making 
inferences” (p. 297), there are subtle distinctions 
between validity and validation.  Validity may still be a 
property of tests, whereas validation refers to the 
process of investigating claims about a test.  
Nevertheless, their conceptualization of construct 
validity marks a pivotal turn in validity semantics.   
It was not until the 1970’s and 1980’s that theorist 
forcefully emphasized interpretations and entailed uses 
of test scores as the proper location of validity.  This 
view was perhaps most vehemently argued by Messick 
(1975, 1989), though similar positions can be found in 
various other sources (e.g. APA, AERA, NCME, 1974; 
Cronbach, 1971).  Under this view, tests are neither 
valid nor invalid, but it is the proposed use and 
interpretation of test scores that encompasses validity.  
Stated differently, inferences from test scores are either 
valid or invalid.  To understand the rationale for this 
movement, it is beneficial to consider the constructive-
realist position as advocated by Messick (1998).  
Messick (1998) was concerned with various 
philosophical criticisms, particularly the value-laden 
nature of empirical observations.  Given that “theories 
can no longer be tested against facts” but are instead 
“relative to specific social practices of science” 
(Messick, 1998, p. 36), there are dangers in presuming 
that psychological concepts directly refer to a given 
reality.  Messick however, did not abandon realist 
sympathies, and instead argued for an alternative 
account that combined constructivist criticism and 
psychometric realism:   
“In this constructive-realist view of 
psychological measurement, constructs 
represent our best, albeit imperfect and 
fallible, efforts to capture the essence of traits 
that have a reality independent of our attempt 
to characterize them.  Just as on the realist 
side there may be traits operative in behavior 
for which no construct has yet been 
formulated, on the constructive side there are 
useful constructs having no counterpart in 
reality” (p. 35).   
Messick draws a subtle distinction between 
constructs and the traits or attributes to which 
constructs may refer (Hood, 2009).  Constructs may 
either refer or fail to refer to attributes that exist 
irrespective of human input.  Consequently, Messick 
seems to adopt a form of realism wherein our 
theoretical terms may correctly describe unobservable 
attributes, though our epistemic accessibility to these 
attributes remains problematic.  Messick (1989) 
however, sought to unify semantics under the label 
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“construct validity,” which broadly concerns “an 
integration of any evidence that bears on the 
interpretation or meaning of the test scores” (p. 7).  
Thus, validity pertains to the degree to which evidence 
and theory support the adequacy and appropriateness 
of score-based inferences (Messick, 1989).   
 Many contemporary theorists have criticized this 
unified picture of validity.  These criticisms stem from 
concerns about the ambiguity of the term “construct” 
and an inability of this approach to guide validation 
efforts (Borsboom, Cramer, Kievit, Scholten, & Franic, 
2009; Kane, 2001).  In other words, under this view it is 
difficult for test developers to articulate where validity 
evidence should begin and end.  There also appears to 
be relative consensus that nomological networks, as 
originally articulated by Cronbach and Meehl (1955), 
have failed to be identified in education and the social 
sciences.  Though it remains possible that undiscovered 
law-like relationships exist, such relationship have not, 
and perhaps never will be, identified in educational and 
psychological research.  This led to a proliferation of 
what Cronbach (1988) refers to as weak validity 
programs that seek to establish a loose network of ill-
defined interrelationships in validation research.  
Nevertheless, locating validity as a property of score-
based interpretations and entailed uses has remained a 
consistent theme in contemporary validity semantics.  
This position is adopted within the most recent 
Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing 
(1999), which indicates that validity is “…the degree to 
which evidence and theory support an interpretation of 
test scores entailed by proposed uses” (APA, AEAR, & 
NCME, p. 9).  This statement implies that validity is an 
open-ended evaluation that varies according to 
evidential support.  As such, validity is not an all-or-
nothing statement, but instead inferences are more or 
less valid according to existing evidence. 
The argument-based approach to validity 
originated out of these historical developments (Kane, 
2001).  This approach aims to clarify validation efforts 
by requiring researchers to specify assumptions and 
interpretive inferences prior to seeking validity 
evidence.  As previously mentioned however, 
Borsboom and colleagues (2004) have criticized 
locating validity as a property of score-based 
inferences.  Under their view, validity is a binary 
function of truth residing within tests themselves.  The 
following sections delineate each perspective by their 
ontological and epistemological characteristics, as well 
as their breadth of validation focus.   
Validity Semantics under the Argument-
Based Approach 
The historical developments within validity theory, 
particularly the account of construct validity provided 
by Cronbach and Meehl (1955), along with the unified 
view of validity offered by Messick (1988), promoted 
specific principles that Kane (1992, 2006) argues are 
aligned with an argument-based approach.  These 
developments support (a) validity as a property of 
interpretations and not tests, (b) validation consisting 
of an extended investigation, (c) consequences of 
testing as an aspect of this investigation, and (d) 
subjecting interpretations, assumptions, and proposed 
uses of scores to logical and empirical examination.  
Instead of placing construct validity as a unifying 
feature of validity theory, Kane (1992, 2013) provides a 
unified view of validity by locating interpretative and 
validity arguments at its’ center.  Succinctly put, 
individuals construct arguments for each score-based 
interpretation or entailed use of test scores.  Validation 
consists of subjecting these inferences, and plausible 
alternatives, to both logical and empirical examination.   
An interpretive argument “lays the network of 
inferences leading from the test scores to the 
conclusions to be drawn and any decisions to be based 
on these conclusions” (Kane, 2001, p. 329).  Since 
validity resides with an interpretation, as opposed to a 
test, it is conceivable that multiple score-based 
interpretations and proposed uses exist for the same set 
of scores.  If one developed 20 test items pertaining to 
statistical hypothesis testing, relatively simple evidence 
may be needed if these scores are primarily used as an 
indication of achievement within a specific course.  For 
example, it may be possible to investigate the alignment 
of items to specific learning objectives, or estimate the 
generalizability of scores on observed items to a 
universe of possible items.  Much stronger evidence 
would be required if one wished to interpret these 
scores as an indication of statistical aptitude, or if 
administration decided to use these scores for 
placement into academic programs.  Consequently, the 
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content of an interpretative argument frames subsequent 
validation efforts since distinct score-based interpretations 
require different lines of evidential support (Kane, 
2009).  
Ontology. Locating validity as a property of 
interpretations, as portrayed in the argument-based 
approach, does not necessitate a realist or antirealist 
position toward the existence of educational and 
psychological attributes, traits, or skills.  A 
psychometric realist, at least in the sense used within 
the present article, contends that testing procedures 
aim to measure entities in the actual world.  As 
previously discussed, an anti-realist may deny this 
claim.  For example, the collegiate learning assessment 
(CLA) is a performance-based measure aiming to assess 
critical thinking, analytical problem solving, and other 
higher-level cognitive skills (Klein, Benjamin, 
Shavelson, & Bolus, 2007).  The realist would view 
“critical thinking” as an entity in the actual world and 
could conceivably argue that the CLA aims to assess 
variation in this entity.  Denial of this position may 
occur in various ways.  For example, the antirealist may 
argue that at best, “critical thinking” is a concept that is 
more or less useful for achieving valued aims and 
purposes.  Alternatively, an antirealist may remain 
agnostic with respect to the existence of critical 
thinking as an entity that exists in the actual world.  Put 
differently, an antirealist may view the existence of 
critical thinking as unimportant to the theory of critical 
thinking (Borsboom, 2005).  The argument-based 
approach to validity remains uncommitted to either the 
realist or the antirealist viewpoint.  This is reinforced by 
recognizing a distinction between score-based 
interpretations and entailed uses of test scores.   
Including entailed uses of scores within the 
semantics of validity indicates that this concept 
incorporates the consequences resultant from testing 
procedures (Kane, 2012).  The aims of assessment or 
testing may be indifferent to the ontological status of 
unobservable theoretical entities, attributes, or skills.  
For example, some researchers primarily use 
standardized tests to predict subsequent performance 
(Mattern, Kobrin, Patterson, Shaw, & Camara, 2009) or 
they may use test scores to select candidates for 
entrance into special programs.  In this situation, it is 
the proposed use of the scores, not the ontological 
status of an unobservable attribute, which stands in 
need of validation.  An a priori negation of the realist 
or antirealist positions does not therefore occur under 
the argument-based approach to validity.  Put 
differently, the argument-based approach to validity 
remains absent of ontological commitments, at least 
prior to the collection of validation evidence.   
Epistemology. Contrary to the ontological, which is 
generally focused on the “what” of existence, 
epistemological questions focus on the possibility, 
constituents, and limitations of human knowledge 
(Williams, 2001).  As such, the justification of 
knowledge has taken a central place in epistemology as 
a philosophical discipline (Chisholm, 1989), and in an 
analogous way the process of validating score-based 
interpretations and entailed uses of test scores is of 
paramount importance within the argument-based 
approach.  At least two epistemological implications are 
inferred from the argument-based approach: (a) 
appropriate evidence is a function of interpretative 
arguments and (b) validity is a tentative judgment 
employed with varying degrees of certainty.  These 
features underscore the constructed, dynamic, and 
open-ended aspects of validating interpretative 
arguments (Kane, 1992) and result from locating 
validity within the realm of interpretation and the 
constraints imposed by specific interpretative 
arguments.  Thus, each interpretative argument 
establishes boundaries or parameters that guide the 
validation process.   
The argument-based approach is aligned with the 
view that “extraordinary claims require extraordinary 
evidence” (Sagan, 1980), whereas less ambitious claims 
require less extraordinary evidence.  For example, “it is 
possible to answer questions about whether a person 
can perform a job, without having any deep 
understanding of how they perform the job” (Kane, 
2009, p. 53).  Assessment practitioners and researchers 
may therefore model patterns in observed data, in such 
a way, that useful predictions are facilitated without any 
understanding of the underlying mechanisms that 
account for observed score variation.  This view is 
therefore aligned with the distinction between 
prediction and explanation (Pedhazur, 1997), yet once 
again, the content of the interpretative argument 
informs validation criteria.  However, interpretative 
6
Practical Assessment, Research, and Evaluation, Vol. 18 [2013], Art. 9
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/pare/vol18/iss1/9
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7275/ay6p-xw09
Practical Assessment, Research & Evaluation, Vol 18, No 9 Page 7 
Hathcoat, Validity Semantics 
 
 
arguments, at least broadly speaking, are examined for 
their coherence and plausibility given the available 
evidence (Kane, 2012).  Claims to validity are not 
necessarily claims to truth, but instead reflect evaluative 
judgments about a given line of evidence.   
Breadth of Validation Focus. Validation efforts 
under the argument-based approach are exclusively 
constrained by the number and content of score-based 
interpretations and proposed uses of scores.  Once 
articulated, an interpretive argument for a set of scores 
can limit the evidence needed to support a claim.  
However, given that a potentially unlimited number of 
interpretations may be advanced for the same set of 
scores, or the possibility that the same scores may be 
used to make multiple decisions, the argument-based is 
considered broad in focus.  For example, the CLA may 
be interpreted strictly as indicators of performance 
within a target domain or as a measure of critical 
thinking.  Moreover, these scores could be used to 
make decisions about student placement or to establish 
benchmarks when making institutional comparisons.  A 
consequence of placing validity as property of 
interpretations and uses is that each of these 
possibilities, once proposed, is included within the 
argument-based approach.  This breadth of focus 
stands in sharp contrast to the instrument-based 
approach to validity.  
Validity Semantics under the Instrument-
Based Approach 
Instead of locating validity as a property of score-
based inferences, validity is located as a property of 
tests themselves under the instrument-based approach.  
This position is reminiscent of earlier theorists who 
indicated that tests themselves are either valid or invalid 
(Kelley, 1927).  Borsboom’s exposition of this view 
entails an ontological emphasis requiring commitment 
to psychometric realism if ever a validity claim is 
accepted (Hood, 2009).  As discussed below, the ability 
to warrant causal inferences is the fundamental criteria 
for evaluating test validity.  This focus on causal 
mechanisms restricts the breadth of validation focus to 
an examination of such processes.  Hood (2009) has 
expounded upon both the ontological and 
epistemological characteristics of this view, thus the 
present section entails a reformulation and expansion 
of this work.   
Before proceeding, a succinct summarization of 
Borsboom’s validity semantics is in order.  Borsboom, 
Van Heerden, and Mellenbergh (2003) provide the 
following definition of validity:   
Test X is valid for the measurement of 
attribute Y if an only if the proposition 
“Scores on test X measure attribute Y” is true 
(p. 323).   
There are a few points to notice about this 
definition.  First, validity is strictly located as a property 
of tests since it pertains to a single proposition 
indicating that scores measure an attribute.  This 
definition would therefore naturally lead to questions 
about the semantics of measurement, and Borsboom 
(2005) relies upon the latent variable model to provide 
such a framework.  The latent variable model contends 
that covariation between observed scores can be 
explained or accounted for by unobservable entities.  
The rationale for selecting the latent variable model 
becomes evident when considering the following 
requirements for validity claims:  
A test is valid for measuring an attribute if and 
only if (a) the attribute exists, (b) variations in 
the attribute causally produce variations in the 
outcomes of the measurement procedure 
(Borsboom et al., 2004, p. 1061) 
In contrast to the argument-based approach 
(Kane, 1992, 2001), wherein validity is a function of 
evidential support, Borsboom instead argues that 
validity is a function of truth itself (see Borsboom, et 
al., 2009).  Consequently, the truth-value of validity 
claims is a function of two conditions.  First, the 
attribute entailing the aim measurement must actually 
exist.  Secondly, differences in this attribute are causally 
responsible for differences in observed scores.  
Ontology. The conditions provided by Borsboom for 
establishing validity require the existence of 
psychological attributes.  An individual who rejects 
psychometric realism must therefore reject all claims to 
validity under this approach (see Hood, 2009).  For 
example, it is technically possible that an antirealist 
would accept Borsboom’s position that a test is valid if 
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indeed it captures variation in real-attributes.  However, 
to maintain an antirealist position, which may either 
deny the existence of these attributes or our ability to 
detect such attributes, the antirealist would have to 
reject that any test is indeed valid.  To put this 
differently, the antirealist may accept the validity 
semantics yet discard either the ontological status of 
these attributes or the epistemic possibility of 
warranting such claims.  The psychometric realist on 
the other hand can maintain consistency irrespective of 
whether a test is valid or invalid.   
Locating validity as a property of tests themselves, 
at least as conceived by Borsboom, appears to 
necessitate psychometric realism if ever a test is 
deemed valid.  Accepting measures of theoretical 
attributes, such as “critical thinking,” “written 
communication,” and “respect for diversity,” as valid 
obliges one to accept the position that these are indeed 
entities within the actual world, as opposed to 
instrumental devices (see Duhem, 1954; Popper, 1963).  
Additionally, these attributes must exist in such a way 
that they act as efficient causes on observed scores.  It 
should be clear however, that this idea of causation, 
though aligned with latent variable theory, does not 
necessarily coincide with causal efficacy within a single 
individual.  For example, and as discussed by 
Borsboom, the five factor model of personality 
(McCrae & Costa, 1999), may account for variation 
between people, yet this does not imply that these 
factors reside within a single individual.   
There are two important consequences of this 
perspective.  First, mapping between-person and 
within-person variation is of central importance.  There 
are dangers in presuming that between-person models 
align with within-person variation.  If such models 
coincide, then no additional theoretical work may be 
necessary.  However, if between-person models are 
different from within-person models then theories 
must account for such discrepancies.  The second 
implication, which in some ways derives from the first, 
suggests that underlying processes accounting for 
between-person differences may be different than what 
occurs within a person.  For example, differences in 
extraversion between people may account for patterns 
in item responses.  However, extraversion may be 
constant within an individual.  Since causality between 
X and Y requires X and Y to covary, a constant level of 
extraversion could not act as a causal force within a 
person (see Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & Van Heerden, 
2003).  Test validity would therefore pertain to 
processes occurring at both of these levels.  This leads 
to a consideration of the epistemological characteristics 
of this position, which emphasizes an explication of 
process models wherein establishing causal inferences 
is essential.   
Epistemology. Validity under this approach is 
inherently ontological and the truth of this ontological 
claim is independent of epistemological issues, or our 
ability to evaluate these claims (Borsboom, 
Mellenbergh, & Van Heerden, 2004).  An instrument 
may be valid without any existing evidential support, or 
conversely an instrument may be invalid despite a line 
of seemingly strong supportive evidence.  Borsboom 
and colleagues have argued that if the aim of 
measurement is to construct an instrument that is 
sensitive to variation in entities, then the truth of this 
ontological claim guarantees validity.  Thus “validity is 
about ontology; validation is about epistemology” and 
the “two should not be confused” (p. 1063).  Validity is 
therefore bound to the ontological status of theoretical 
entities and their causal connection to empirical 
observations.  Without the existence of actual entities, 
validity also ceases to exist.  Validation on the other 
hand, consists of the empirical explication of causal 
processes from an attribute to differences in observed 
scores.  Establishing this causal connection appears to 
require the existence of strong theory and a priori 
knowledge about how variation in an attribute leads to 
changes in observed scores.   
This position departs from the evidential criteria 
guiding most validation practices, which heavily relies 
on investigating correlation matrices.  Consider the 
typical process of validation research.  First, a 
researcher may create an instrument in collaboration 
with content experts who provide ratings about 
construct representation.  Subsequent investigations 
typically examine the internal structure of the 
instrument (e.g. perhaps by conducting a factor analysis 
along with reliability estimates).  The internal structure 
of the test may then be compared across different 
populations, with the same population across time, or 
across distinct environmental conditions.  Finally, 
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correlations are sought with numerous variables to 
examine the external structure of the test.  Generally 
speaking, if both the internal structure and external 
structure correspond with theoretical expectations, 
then researchers feel confident that they are measuring 
the intended attribute.  
This line of evidential support is largely inadequate 
under the instrument-based approach.  To see this, it is 
first necessary to be clear about measurement under 
Borsboom’s approach.  Various theories of 
measurement have been proposed (e.g. Stevens, 1946; 
Rasch, 1960) and much of this remains controversial 
(see Michell, 1999).  However, Borsboom (2005) has 
argued that the practice of measurement requires the 
existence of entities that are responsible for producing 
variation in observed scores.  Measurement is therefore 
both directional and causal (Borsboom et al., 2004).  
This naturally aligns with the latent variable model, the 
truth of which would essentially clinch the question of 
validity (Borsboom et al., 2009).  However, how does 
one establish the truth of this model?  Unfortunately, 
Borsboom has not provided many details about how 
this would work, though he has alluded to some 
possibilities. 
An obvious choice may be to conduct a 
confirmatory factor analysis, which could examine how 
well a theoretical model fits patterns within observed 
data.  However, adequate model fit does not itself 
demonstrate causality and the problem of 
underdetermination also poses challenges for claims to 
test validity.  In other words, even with adequate model 
fit alternative models may equally account for the 
observed data.  Such issues have led Borsboom to 
argue for process models specifying how variation in an 
attribute leads to responses on items or tasks.  Instead 
of constructing an instrument and then trying to 
determine what it measures, instruments are 
constructed with theories detailing how differences in 
an attribute lead to specific responses.  Borsboom 
illustrates how this may be done by referring to a 
balance scale task given to children (Borsboom et al., 
2004).  This task requires students to determine 
whether a balance scale will tip to one side, or remain 
equal, given the distribution of weights that are placed 
along the scale.  Theories exist about specific strategies 
children use across developmental stages.  Such 
theories allow one to construct tasks so that children 
relying on certain strategies will tend to fail a particular 
item.  These developmental strategies can be translated 
into a model that investigates the extent to which latent 
class membership corresponds to patterns in observed 
responses (Jansen and Van der Maas, 1997).  Validation 
under the instrument-based approach thus extends 
beyond methodological decisions detached from 
theoretical considerations.  Theory is crucial for 
detailing processes leading to response behavior, which 
is the crux of validity under the instrument-based 
approach.   
Breadth of validation focus.  Locating validity as a 
property of tests themselves, and concurrently 
requiring one to establish causal relations between 
theoretical attributes and observed scores as a sole aim 
of validation, restricts the breadth of focus to these 
endeavors.  Under the argument-based approach, the 
content of interpretative inferences informs evidential 
requirements in validation research.  However, the 
validity semantics provided by Borsboom locates 
evidential criteria within the realm of causal relations.  
Thus, whether the SAT is useful for admission 
purposes would remain outside the purview of validity 
theory.  This does not imply that such questions are 
unimportant or unworthy of investigation, but only that 
they are separate concerns from test validity.  There are 
other implications of this position.  For example, it is 
technically inappropriate to incorporate the 
consequences of testing as an aspect of validity theory.  
Tests may be valid in Borsboom’s sense, yet still have 
undesirable consequences in various applied settings.  
Though consequences are important, the central 
question of validity would instead pertain to invariance 
of causal relations across different conditions and/or 
populations.  In sum, the validity semantics under the 
instrument-based approach restricts validation efforts 
to a single proposition—scores on a particular test 
measure a specified attribute.  Causal relationships 
constitute the heart of validity and consequently inform 
validation efforts.   
Discussion 
The concept of validity is fluid in educational and 
psychological testing.  Scholars have diverged in validity 
semantics throughout the history of educational and 
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psychological testing.  Broadly speaking, validity theory 
has witnessed a cyclical affinity with antirealist 
perspectives.  However, scattered throughout this 
history are points of contention, division, and 
disagreement about the proper location of validity.  
Accepting that tests themselves are valid or invalid 
nicely coincides with psychometric realism, or the 
position that instruments indeed measure real 
attributes; whereas, locating validity with the realm of 
interpretation appears to more easily coalesce with 
antirealist affinities in that an antirealist may 
consistently accept some, but not all, test-score 
interpretations as valid.  Nevertheless, strictly speaking, 
locating validity semantics as a property of inferences 
or instruments does not alone necessitate either of 
these views (Hood, 2009).  What does seem important, 
at least for assessment practitioners, is that these 
divergent validity semantics amount to more than 
arbitrary affinities.  Thus far, this discussion has largely 
been philosophical and theoretical in character.  I 
therefore wish to conclude this discussion by briefly 
underscoring some of the pragmatic implications of 
this debate.   
Before proceeding, I will make some final 
comments about the argument-based (Kane, 1992, 
2013) and instrument-based (Borsboom et al., 2004) 
approaches to validity.  The argument-based approach 
to validity is wide in scope, given that it incorporates 
multiple score-based interpretations and uses.  The 
instrument-based approach restricts validity to one 
specific interpretation – scores on Test X are caused by 
variation in attribute Y.  An individual who agrees with 
the argument-based approach may choose to adopt the 
score-based interpretation advocated by Borsboom.  
Both positions are therefore consistent, at least in this 
minimal respect.  They do depart in important ways 
however.  The argument-based approach views validity 
as an open-ended judgment that varies according to 
evidential support.  Tests are not valid or invalid, but 
instead inferences derived from scores are more or less 
valid.  The argument-based approach also incorporates 
the consequences of testing as an aspect of validity.  
Borsboom (2005) entirely rejects these aspects of the 
argument-based approach by articulating an account of 
validity informed by measurement theory.  Various 
aspects of measurement theory remain controversial, so 
it is interesting to note that many theorists tend to 
neglect the semantics of measurement in their account 
of validity theory.  Whereas Borsboom views validity as 
intricately connected to the meaning of measurement, 
the argument-based approach remains largely silent on 
such issues.   
Clearly, assessment is concerned with more than 
formal “tests” per say, and the semantic differences 
described in this paper have implications well beyond 
formal testing.  Educational and psychological 
assessment constitutes diverse aims and practices that 
definitely include testing, but it also incorporates 
alternative practices such as performance, portfolio, 
and classroom assessment.  Though Borsboom 
discusses validity as a property of a test, it seems 
conceivable to broaden this view to other assessment 
practices.  For example, scores are often given to 
student assignments, portfolios, oral presentations, and 
other samples of performance-based activities.  The 
instrument-based approach to validity may therefore be 
applicable to any assessment activity aiming to measure 
variation in an attribute.  The argument-based approach 
to validity seems applicable to most, if not all, 
assessment activities.  Given the scope of assessment 
activities, does adherence to psychometric realism 
matter?  How should we conceptualize validity within 
the context of assessment?  These are challenging 
questions that lack a simple resolution.   
Educational assessment is value-laden, in that 
assessment activities generally aim to investigate the 
achievement of desired student-learning outcomes.  
The importance of psychometric realism, as defined in 
this article, may depend upon the context in which 
assessment occurs.  For the sake of simplicity, one may 
consider writing as a student-learning outcome.  To 
assess this outcome student papers may be selected 
across the campus that are then scored by raters using a 
common rubric.  These scores presumably reflect 
differences in an attribute, that of individual differences 
in writing.  However, what evidence do we have that 
variation in the quality of writing, and not something 
else, actually influences observed scores?  It seems, at 
least in cases such as this, that processes through which 
observed scores are manifest are important validity 
considerations.  If for example, we find that assignment 
characteristics systematically elevate or deflate scores 
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then the integrity of data-driven decisions resultant 
from this procedure is questionable.  A similar line of 
reasoning exists for institutional effectiveness, which 
minimally consists of an examination of value-added 
outcomes.  Institutional effectiveness is an attribute 
that presumably acts as an efficient cause on learning 
outcomes.  Mapping how variation in institutional 
experiences lead to differences in student learning 
outcomes is therefore crucial.  This implies that the aim 
of many assessment processes may implicitly assume a 
form of realism.   
Within other contexts however, the realist position 
remains irrelevant.  Consider validation efforts of the 
SAT, a test that is widely used for admission purposes 
across many institutions of higher education.  
According to the argument-based approach, validity 
evidence is necessary for each proposed use and 
interpretation of these scores.  If one uses the test solely 
to make predictive inferences about student success in 
college, then validity entails the degree to which 
evidence supports this entailed use of test scores.  This 
specific use remains unconcerned with psychometric 
realism, or the position that observed scores reflect 
differences in an underlying trait or attribute.  It is also 
worth noting that such inferences may be valid 
irrespective of test content.  If self-reported frequency 
of coffee consumption were highly correlated with 
first-year GPA in undergraduate courses, then using 
these scores for admission purposes may very well be 
valid.  Such a view resembles a pragmatic or 
instrumental orientation toward measurement (Stevens, 
1946).  In other words, whether scores are sensitive to 
variation in an underlying attribute is unimportant so 
long as these scores are capable of doing what we want 
them to do.  Under Borsboom’s approach, this line of 
evidence is irrelevant to validity, which strictly involves 
a causal relation between observed scores and an 
underlying attribute.  Validation efforts would therefore 
exclusively consist of investigating underlying causal 
processes through which observed scores are manifest.  
This does not imply that evidence for entailed uses of 
test scores is unimportant, but such questions fall 
outside the scope of formal validity theory.   
Finally, if Borsboom’s criteria for test validity are 
accepted, then the validity of most existent tests in 
educational and psychological assessment remains 
suspect.  This is not a point against Borsboom, but 
merely an indication of how accepting this position 
may radically alter validity claims within assessment 
practices.  Perhaps the strength of Borsboom’s 
approach, irrespective of whether one agrees with the 
validity semantics, is that his view underscores a need 
to investigate a relatively neglected area in educational 
and psychological assessment – namely, process models 
underlying observed score variation.  Investigation of 
these processes may be invaluable for assessment 
practitioners.  Furthermore, between-person models do 
not necessarily correspond to models within a person.  
This is an important consideration, given that distinct 
processes leading to observed scores may exist across 
these models.  As assessment practices continue to 
evolve, between-person models may be insufficient for 
many of the tasks that lie ahead.  However, the 
importance of this distinction largely depends upon the 
kinds of claims one wishes to make:  
“…that 30 per cent of interindividual 
variation in success in college may be 
predicted from the grade point average in 
high school, does not mean that 30 per cent 
of the exams you passed were predictable 
from your high school grades; and that there 
is a sex difference in verbal ability does not 
mean that your verbal ability will change if 
you undergo a sex change operation” 
(Borsboom, 2005, p. 77).  
 
Both the argument-based approach and 
instrument-based approach to validity are consistent 
with an examination of such models.  Thus the critical 
question, at least for assessment practitioners, is 
whether we wish to require a commitment to 
psychometric realism for accepting validity claims.  
Answering this question is well beyond the scope of the 
present article.  Nevertheless, the field of educational 
and psychological assessment, to the extent that it 
wishes to address validity, may eventually need to 
contend with the implications of these divergent 
positions.   
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